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Is Something Better than Nothing? Critical Reflections 
on Ten Years of the FMLA 
Michael Selmi* 
In a remarkable decision last Term, the Supreme Court upheld the 
Family and Medical Leave Act1 as applied to state employers.2 The 
decision was remarkable for at least three reasons. First, the decision 
signaled an important break from what had been a consistent pattern 
of invalidation of the application of civil rights statutes to state actors 
in the name of sovereign immunity.3 Second, the language of the 
decision was remarkable in terms of its focus on the discrimination 
that women continue to experience in the workplace, as well as the 
ways in which drafters designed the FMLA to remedy that 
discrimination. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the statute was 
designed “to protect the right to be free from gender-based 
discrimination in the workplace,”4 explaining that “Congress sought 
to adjust family leave policies in order to eliminate their reliance on 
and perpetuation of invalid stereotypes, and thereby dismantle 
persisting gender-based barriers to the hiring, retention, and 
promotion of women in the workplace.”5 Focusing on the way the 
policies had been established with women in mind as primary 
caregivers, the Chief Justice wrote: 
 * Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. I am grateful for 
research assistance provided by Emily Bradford and Stacy Garrick.  
 1. 5 U.S.C. §§ 6381–87 (2000); 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–54 (2000 & Supp. I 2001–2002). 
 2. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003).  
 3. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (invalidating suit 
against the state under the Americans With Disabilities Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 
U.S. 62 (2000) (same, but under Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Coll. Savs. Bank v. 
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (same, but under Trademark 
Remedy Clarification Act); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (same, but under 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act); Seminole Tribe Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (same, 
but under Indian Gaming Regulation Act). 
 4. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1978. 
 5. Id. at 1981 n.10. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 65 Selmi book pages.doc  4/23/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 15:65 
 
 
 
Stereotypes about women's domestic roles are reinforced by 
parallel stereotypes presuming a lack of domestic 
responsibilities for men. Because employers continued to 
regard the family as the woman's domain, they often denied 
men similar accommodations or discouraged them from taking 
leave. These mutually reinforcing stereotypes created a self-
fulfilling cycle of discrimination that forced women to 
continue to assume the role of primary family caregiver, and 
fostered employers' stereotypical views about women's 
commitment to work and their value as employees. Those 
perceptions, in turn, Congress reasoned, lead to subtle 
discrimination that may be difficult to detect on a case-by-case 
basis. 
. . . . 
By creating an across-the-board, routine employment benefit 
for all eligible employees, Congress sought to ensure that 
family-care leave would no longer be stigmatized as an 
inordinate drain on the workplace caused by female 
employees, and that employers could not evade leave 
obligations simply by hiring men. By setting a minimum 
standard of family leave for all eligible employees, irrespective 
of gender, the FMLA attacks the formerly state-sanctioned 
stereotype that only women are responsible for family 
caregiving, thereby reducing employers' incentives to engage 
in discrimination by basing hiring and promotion decisions on 
stereotypes.6 
Without question, this is some of the Court’s strongest language in 
the last two decades recognizing and condemning discrimination 
against women; the fact that it was written by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, who is not known for his progressive views on gender, 
makes it all the more remarkable.7 
 6. Id. at 1982–83. 
 7. One author has speculated that Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion and forceful 
language may have been attributable to his own recent experience. His daughter is a single 
mother and the article noted that, “Several times this term, the 78-year-old Chief Justice . . . left 
work early to pick up his granddaughters from school.” Linda Greenhouse, Evolving Opinions: 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol15/iss1/4
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The third reason that the case stands out has so far received no 
public attention, and it is the focus of this essay. Despite the Court’s 
strong language, ten years after the FMLA’s implementation, it is 
clear that the statute has not accomplished its goals with respect to 
combating stereotypes or discrimination against women in the 
workplace. To the extent it has had any effect at all on these issues, 
the statute has likely exacerbated both, though probably only to a 
socially insignificant degree.8 And contrary to Justice Rehnquist’s 
emphasis, those portions of the statute that have proved most 
effective have not been the portions originally considered central 
during the legislative debate. By far, the FMLA is most frequently 
used by employees for their own serious illness—a fact that has 
effectively transformed the statute from one involving family leave to 
one involving sick leave. From this perspective, it was a marvelous 
feat of advocacy to have the Hibbs Court describe the FMLA as a 
guard against discrimination and stereotyping.  
It is this part of the statute’s history that I will focus on in this 
essay, as I want to explore how the statute came to deviate so 
significantly from its publicly stated goals. As will become clear 
below, this deviation was not the result of unexpected developments 
or hostile judicial interpretations; on the contrary, the statute has 
developed exactly as should have been expected by its legislative 
drafters.9 At the time the legislation was enacted, there was no 
substantial reason to believe that it would accomplish anything more 
than it has. There was no reason, for example, to believe that men 
would begin to take substantial leave under the Act. Nor was there 
reason to think that unpaid leave would significantly aid women 
following the birth or adoption of a child, except for those women 
Heartfelt Words from the Rehnquist Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2003, § 4 (Week in Review), at 
3. 
 8. One recent study measuring the employment and wage effects of the statute on 
women concluded that the effects were largely neutral. Jane Waldfogel, The Impact of the 
Family and Medical Leave Act, 18 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 281 (1999). Although there 
appeared to be some net positive effects on women’s employment, there were few wage effects, 
leading to the conclusion that “the[] effects to a large extent offset each other.” Id. at 300. This 
study used data from the final year before, and the first two years after, passage of the FMLA. 
Id. at 294.  
 9. The one exception to this general premise is the fact that the sick leave provisions 
have become more important than originally contemplated by the drafters. 
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who could afford to take such leave, which, almost by definition, 
would tend to be high-wage earning women who were seeking to 
extend the leave their employers already provided.  
This essay will explore some of the history that led to the FMLA’s 
passage, and then will contrast the publicly stated expectations with 
the realities of the statute’s use since its enactment. Two published 
studies have examined the extent and nature of leave taken or needed 
by employees pursuant to the FMLA. Those studies demonstrate that 
the leave provisions relating to the birth or adoption of a child have 
proved to be the least important parts of the statute to employees, in 
direct contrast to the emphasis within the legislation and its history. 
I will then turn to a discussion of why the interest groups 
supporting the legislation were willing to settle for such a weak bill. 
Advocates of family leave legislation generally asserted two 
rationales for the importance of the statute: (1) Something was better 
than nothing, and relatedly, the FMLA would be, if nothing else, an 
important symbolic victory; and (2) that the FMLA would be a 
critical “foot in the door” leading to better and more progressive 
legislation in the future. I will question both of these rationales, and 
also analyze some of the important, and often overlooked, costs to the 
legislation that directly challenge the notion that some legislation is 
better than no legislation. I will also suggest that the special interests 
of the advocacy groups in passing legislation may have provided an 
important and unacknowledged rationale for pursuing the statute 
despite its obvious deficiencies. In this respect, this essay will also be 
a case study in legislative enactment and the various motives that can 
underlie what otherwise appears to be public-spirited legislation. 
I. LEGISLATIVE EXPECTATIONS 
Issues relating to work and family have been on the congressional 
agenda continuously since 1945.10 It was not, however, until 1981 
 10. See Paul Burstein et al., Policy Alternatives and Political Change: Work, Family, and 
Gender on the Congressional Agenda, 1945–1990, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 67 (1995). “Federal 
regulation of family and gender in the workplace has been on the congressional agenda 
continuously since 1945. Work-family bills have been introduced in every congress [sic], and 
by the end of 1990 the cumulative total of sponsorships supporting such bills reached 3,898.” 
Id. at 74 (footnote omitted). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol15/iss1/4
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that Congress began to consider legislation that would accommodate 
work-family matters by providing leave for those with 
responsibilities to care for children.11 More than a decade later, these 
legislative efforts culminated in the passage of the FMLA, which had 
originally been introduced in Congress in the mid-1980s. The history 
of the FMLA has been detailed elsewhere,12 and I will not repeat it 
here. Rather, in this essay, I want to focus on one particular aspect of 
that history, namely the various rationales and expectations that 
surrounded the leave legislation, as compared with the reality of the 
legislation ultimately implemented. 
Introduced in 1985 by Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder and 
two of her colleagues, the Parental and Disability Leave Act13 
required employers to provide eighteen weeks of unpaid leave upon 
the birth or adoption of a child, to care for the serious illness of a 
child or for the temporary disabilities of the employee herself.14 The 
legislation also required that the employee be able to return to her job 
once the leave was over and retain her health insurance during the 
leave. Not surprisingly, this legislation—along with another bill, the 
Parental and Medical Leave Act—immediately met strong resistance 
from business groups, led by the Chamber of Commerce, which 
initially estimated that the legislation would cost businesses sixteen 
billion dollars per year.15  
 11. Id. at 77–78. The authors divide proposed legislation into three categories: (1) separate 
spheres legislation, intended to reinforce women working in the home; (2) equal opportunity 
legislation, designed to prohibit differential treatment of women and to enhance equal 
opportunity; and (3) work-family accommodation legislation, which sought to provide some 
accommodation to the competing demands of work and family. Id. at 69, 73. The authors 
developed a lengthy schema for determining which legislation fell into which category and 
ultimately concluded that most of the proposed legislation fit into one of the three categories. 
Id. at 72–74. They concluded that 14.5% of the legislation could be labeled separate sphere 
legislation, while 59.3% was categorized as equal opportunity, and 23.3% was 
accommodationist. Id. at 74.  
 12. See RONALD ELVING, CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE (1995). For an interesting history 
from two of the participants in the battle to pass the FMLA, see also DONNA R. LENHOFF & 
LISSA BELL, GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR WORKING FAMILIES AND FOR COMMUNITIES, 
available at http://www.nationalpartnership.org (last visited Apr. 19, 2004). 
 13. H.R. 2020, 99th Cong. § 103 (1985). 
 14. See Emily A. Hayes, Note, Bridging the Gap Between Work and Family: 
Accomplishing the Goals of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 42 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1507, 1518–19 (2001) (discussing predecessors to the FMLA).  
 15. See Kerry Elizabeth Knobelsdorff, Congress Enters the Debate over Time Off for 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 65 Selmi book pages.doc  4/23/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
70 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 15:65 
 
 
 
These original attempts at unpaid leave legislation established the 
framework for what would ultimately become the FMLA. Certain 
provisions were weakened before the bill’s final passage, while those 
relating to the care of others were strengthened.16 Two other 
important aspects of the legislation remained largely unchanged 
throughout the bill’s history. Early in the legislative battle, legislators 
decided that the statute should include men, as well as women, within 
its scope, despite pressure from some of the earliest supporters of 
family leave legislation to offer leave only to women.17 Women’s 
groups, the early and primary supporters of the statute, objected to 
limiting leave to women based largely on the feminist argument 
relating to the need for equality rather than accommodation for 
women.18 Others questioned whether providing leave only to women 
would raise legal concerns and might disadvantage women by 
making them more expensive to employers.19  
Family Care, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 5, 1987, at 10 (noting that the Chamber of 
Commerce initially estimated the cost of the Parental and Medical Leave Act [never enacted] as 
“roughly $16 billion a year” while it later lowered its estimate to $2.6 billion). The debate over 
the potential costs of the leave legislation led to some unusual arguments. Proponents argued 
that few men would take the leave, thus reducing costs, while the opponents stressed the 
likelihood of leave-taking. See Alice H. Cook, Public Policies to Help Dual-Earner Families 
Meet the Demands of the Work World, 42 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 201, 211 (1989) 
(discussing the political battle over cost estimates).  
 16. The Act provides for twelve weeks of unpaid leave, and is limited in scope to apply 
only to employers of more than fifty employees. The minimum hour requirement (1250 hours 
for FMLA coverage) was also subsequently added. See Hayes, supra note 14, at 1519.  
 17. See ELVING, supra note 12, at 21–34. Although Patricia Schroeder came to be most 
closely aligned with the legislation as ultimately passed, two other male representatives from 
California, George Miller and Howard Berman were also significantly involved. Indeed, much 
of the precedent was established through hearings that Miller convened on childcare when some 
of those who testified emphasized the importance of allowing mothers the time to bond with 
their children after their birth. See id. at 27 (discussing testimony of Sheila Kamerman and 
others). 
 18. At the time the FMLA began to percolate in Congress, a lively debate was brewing 
among feminist academics between what were typically labeled models of equality and 
accommodation. Professor Wendy Williams was the leading academic voice at the time 
stressing the equality model, which deemed it essential that women be treated equally to men, 
rather than seeking any special accommodations for pregnancy; Williams was also closely 
involved in the coalition that supported the FMLA. See ELVING, supra note 12, at 39–42. For 
Williams’s argument, see Wendy W. Williams, Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal 
Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325 (1985), and for 
a useful summary of the debate, see Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way 
Out of the Maternity and Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1986).  
 19. One of the leading groups behind the legislation, formerly known as the Women’s 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol15/iss1/4
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Equally significant, no bill or proposal ever included a provision 
for paid leave; indeed, there were never any serious discussions 
regarding the prospect of including paid leave as part of the 
legislation. From the outset of the legislative process, the bill’s 
drafters determined that paid leave could not achieve majority 
support and was, for that reason, a non-starter.20 Legislators widely 
acknowledged that the absence of paid leave was a glaring deficiency 
in the strength of the policy. Nevertheless, the legislation’s chief 
advocates concluded that federal legislation with unpaid leave would 
be superior to having no federal legislation, a determination which 
was never seriously debated during the FMLA’s seven-year journey 
to passage. 
Once President Clinton signed the bill into law, the absence of 
paid leave led many to criticize the legislation, in significant part 
because critics perceived that only wealthy individuals would be able 
to benefit from the leave provisions.21 The legislative advocates 
responded with two principal arguments. First, and as mentioned 
above, was the political reality that the law would not have passed 
had paid leave been part of the legislative agenda. In this respect, the 
argument was essentially that something was better than nothing. 
Secondly, the advocates defined the legislation as an “important first 
step” toward more comprehensive leave legislation, which would 
ultimately include paid leave. As one advocate stated, “We all want it 
to be paid leave . . . . But this is a good first step. You set a standard 
Legal Defense Fund and now known as the National Partnership for Women and Families, has 
published its own analysis of the legislation’s history. See generally Donna Lenhoff & Claudia 
Withers, Implementation of the Family and Medical Leave Act: Toward the Family-Friendly 
Workplace, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 39 (1994).  
 20. See ELVING, supra note 12, at 30. 
 21. See Nancy E. Dowd, Family Values and Valuing Family: A Blueprint for Family 
Leave, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 335 (1993) (emphasizing importance of paid leave); Kathleen 
Gerson, A Few Good Men: Overcoming the Barriers to Involved Fatherhood, 16 AM. 
PROSPECT 78, 90 (1994) (calling the FMLA “an important start” but advocating paid leave); 
Paul Burstein, Editorial, Family Leave Tests what Politicians Value, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 10, 
1992, at B7 (criticizing earlier bill for not including paid leave); Jordana Hart, Few in Area Use 
Leave Law, Parents Can’t Afford Time Off, BOSTON GLOBE, July 22, 1994, at B1 (discussing 
limited use of the law by employees); L.M. Sixel, Family Leave Goes into Effect Today: 60% of 
Workers Won’t Be Covered, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 5, 1993, at A1 (“The family leave act has 
been described as upper middle class, yuppie legislation—because those are the only people 
who can afford the cut in pay.”). 
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and then you push companies to do more.”22 Karen Nussbaum, the 
Executive Director of 9to5, National Association of Working 
Women, and one of the leading proponents of the legislation, argued 
that the FMLA was both a necessary “minimum standard” and an 
important symbol “that our government understands that working 
people need help balancing work and family.”23 These two responses 
were premised on an assumption that in a few years, following the 
mandated study of the legislation’s effect, amendments would likely 
make the FMLA more responsive to employees’ needs. 
Another critical aspect of the FMLA’s development was the 
primacy placed by the media on the leave provisions relating to 
newborn or adopted children. Although every version of the 
legislation included provisions to grant individuals leave to care for 
the serious illness of a child or themselves, these provisions were 
never highlighted in the same way that the maternity or paternity 
leave provisions were. Virtually all of the news stories emphasized 
the birth and adoption provisions and how the legislation might (or in 
some cases might not) enable new parents to spend more time with 
their children.24 These public stories typically mentioned the leave 
provisions relating to serious illness, but these provisions were rarely 
the central focus of the stories.  
 22. Mimi Hall & Blair S. Walker, Family Leave Act Hits Home, USA TODAY, Aug. 5, 
1993, at 1B (quoting Helen Neuborne of the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund). 
 23. Karen Nussbaum, Editorial, This Is a Sound Start, USA TODAY, Aug. 10, 1992, at 6A. 
Also note that the “first step” theory advancing the idea of future paid leave was even made by 
opponents of the legislation. These opponents were even more adamant that paid leave was on 
the horizon, echoing arguments advanced by the business community to oppose the unpaid 
provision of the legislation. See Richard Whitmire, Family-Leave Law Raises Questions on 
“Next Step”, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 6, 1993, at A6 (quoting Mary Reed of the National 
Federation of Independent Business: “It’s very likely mandated leave legislation will be 
expanded.”); Tom Kenworthy, House Approves Bill Granting Unpaid Job Leave to Workers, 
WASH. POST, May 11, 1990, at A1 (“Mandated leave is just the first step toward 100 percent 
coverage and paid leave.”); David R. Henderson, The Europeanization of the U.S. Labor 
Market, 113 PUB. INT. 66, 79 (1993) (arguing that advocates would seize on the low usage of 
the statute as support for requiring paid leave). 
 24. See, e.g., Michelle Neely Martinez, FMLA Headache or Opportunity?, 39 HR 
MAGAZINE 42 (1994) (discussing the work/family benefits already provided by some 
employers, as compared to the FMLA, and focusing on child leave provisions); Dawn Gunsch, 
The Family Leave Act: A Financial Burden?, 72 PERSONNEL J. 48 (1993) (concentrating on 
maternity leave provisions). 
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While the formal legislative history did refer to the serious illness 
provisions, it generally treated those provisions as the least 
significant portions of the legislation, giving them the shortest 
treatment.25 In part, this lack of attention was attributable to the 
already broad availability of sick leave—or at least, broadly 
perceived availability of sick leave to employees.26 
From the legislative history, one can identify three expectations of 
FMLA’s advocates. First, the statute was intended to ease the burden 
of balancing work and family issues. Second, the legislation would 
likely be a first step to a comprehensive family leave policy that 
would include paid leave, thus bringing the United States closer to 
the leave policies of other industrialized nations. Third, by extending 
the leave provisions to men, the statute was expected to break down 
some of the stereotypes regarding childcare, which was the focus of 
Justice Rehnquist’s decision in Hibbs.27 
These were the publicly stated expectations of the parties working 
on the legislation. It is obviously a good deal more difficult to discern 
what the private expectations may have been, though in the next 
section I will suggest that the public expectations were plainly 
unrealistic in light of the facts known at the time. 
II. THE REALITIES OF THE FMLA 
The ten-year-old FMLA has filled a gap in many employees’ 
benefit packages by allowing them to take periods of sick leave that 
 25. My assessment is based primarily on an impressionistic interpretation of the 
legislative record. I have not tried to count pages, nor have I calculated some weighted 
emphasis, but instead it seems clear that the provisions relating to the birth or adoption of a 
child were the primary impetus behind the statute. Indeed, initially the other leave provisions 
were limited to temporary disabilities and sick children, and were later expanded as a way of 
acquiring the support of the AARP, which was particularly interested in elder care. See ELVING, 
supra note 12, at 157.  
 26. See infra text accompanying note 42. More workers had access to maternity or 
paternity leave than may have been originally thought, and fewer workers had access to sick 
leave than was generally acknowledged. Id. 
 27. See Lenhoff & Withers, supra note 19, at 49 (“By granting both female and male 
employees the right to family and medical leave, the FMLA may help to change society’s 
perception of child care, elder care, and other dependent care as ‘women’s work.’”); supra text 
accompanying notes 5–6, 8. Both Lenhoff and Withers were heavily involved in the passage of 
the FMLA through their work with the National Women’s Law Center. Lenhoff & Withers, 
supra note 19, at 40.  
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they otherwise would not have been granted. But the statute has 
plainly revealed its limitations as a tool for balancing the demands of 
the workplace with family commitments. The statute’s primary 
contribution has been as a form of unpaid sick leave; the family leave 
provisions have been used far less frequently. At the same time, the 
statute has proved beneficial to low-wage workers, contrary to the 
expectations of critics. This has largely been because such workers 
have the least access to voluntarily provided sick leave. 
As part of the FMLA, a commission was established to study the 
statute’s effect. That commission has now produced two reports 
detailing the use and scope of the FMLA, the first published in 1996 
and the most recent study published in 2000.28 The findings are 
consistent in the two reports, and they demonstrate that many 
employees take leave for one of the reasons stated within the FMLA. 
However, in both surveys the largest category of leave-takers 
consisted of those taking leave for their own illness. In 2000, 52.4% 
of leave takers took leave because of their own illness, while in 1996, 
the figure was nearly sixty percent.29 In contrast, 18.5% of leave-
takers took leave to care for newborn or newly adopted children in 
2000 and 17.1% did so in 1996.30 Consistent with the focus on 
illnesses, many of the leave periods were quite short. In the 2000 
study, over half of the longest leaves were for ten or fewer 
workdays.31 The same was true for leave relating to the care of a 
newborn or newly adopted child, where the 2000 study showed that 
 28. See DAVID CANTOR ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., BALANCING THE NEEDS OF FAMILIES 
AND EMPLOYERS, THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE SURVEYS, 2000 UPDATE (2001) (also 
reproducing some facts of the 1996 survey) [hereinafter BALANCING THE NEEDS]; COMM. ON 
FAMILY AND MED. LEAVE, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., A WORKABLE BALANCE: REPORT TO 
CONGRESS ON FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE POLICIES (1996) [hereinafter A WORKABLE 
BALANCE], available at http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/library/downloads/keyworkplacedocuments/ 
familymedical.pdf. I have previously summarized and commented on the 1996 report in 
Michael Selmi, Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap, 78 N.C. L. REV. 707, 763–65 (2000). 
This essay will concentrate on the more recent report. 
 29. See BALANCING THE NEEDS, supra note 28, at tbl.2.3; A WORKABLE BALANCE, supra 
note 28, at 94–95. 
 30. See BALANCING THE NEEDS, supra note 28, at tbl.2.3; A WORKABLE BALANCE, supra 
note 28, at 95. Caring for a sick child or spouse constituted the rest of the leave, and, together 
with caring for oneself or another, sick leave represented 83.3% of all of the leave taken in 
2000. BALANCING THE NEEDS, supra, at tbl.2.3 (summing percentages for leave taken for “own 
health,” “care for ill child,” “care for ill spouse,” and “care for ill parent”). 
 31. Id. at fig.2.2. 
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55.1% of such leave was for ten or fewer days, and less than a third 
(31.5%) lasted longer than thirty days.32 
One important goal of the statute was to shift the responsibility for 
care-taking away from women so that men might share the 
responsibility more equitably. Based on the surveys, however, no 
apparent shift has occurred. Women are more likely than men to take 
FMLA leave: 58.1% of leave-takers in 2000 were women whereas 
women constituted only 48.7% of all employees in the surveyed 
population.33 A recent report analyzing the patterns of leave-taking 
concluded that there was “little evidence that laws that grant 
additional weeks of leave to new fathers have had any effect on 
fathers’ unpaid leave taking or leave lengths.”34  
Both of the Commission surveys also sought to identify those 
individuals who needed to take leave but were unable to do so. For 
the 2000 survey, 2.4% of the surveyed population fell into this 
category, down from 3.1% in the 1996 survey.35 Among the 2000 
survey group, employees’ own illnesses constituted the most 
common need for untaken leave (48.1%), while only 9.3% were 
unable to take leave relating to the birth or adoption of a child.36 The 
surveys also allowed employees to list multiple reasons for not taking 
 32. Id. at tbl.2.7 (summing percentage of longest leave for “1–3,” “4–5,” “6–10,” “31–
60,” and “more than 60 days”). 
 33. BALANCING THE NEEDS, supra note 28, at tbls.A2–2.4, –2.5 (surveying population 
figures). Nearly twenty percent of all eligible women, but only 13.5% of eligible men, took 
leave under the FMLA. Id. at tbl.A.2–2.7. 
 34. Wen-Jui Han & Jane Waldfogel, Parental Leave: The Impact of Recent Legislation on 
Parents’ Leave Taking, 40 DEMOGRAPHY 191, 198 (2003). The authors also sought to 
determine the effect leave laws had on women, and came away with mixed conclusions, 
depending on how the data were analyzed. Based on their analyses, the authors suggested that 
“what [the] data indicate is the limited impact of unpaid leave policies.” Id. There is, however, a 
curious anomaly in the data that should be mentioned. Men were actually slightly more likely 
than women to take leave to care for a newborn: 22.8% of male leave-takers but only 15.3% of 
female leave-takers took leave to care for a new child. BALANCING THE NEEDS, supra note 28, 
at tbl.A2–2.6. The anomaly seems to be attributable to the way the data are classified, as there is 
also a separate category set out in some of the tables for “maternity-disability,” and when those 
figures are added together with the leave for a newborn or adopted child, women take 
significantly more such leave. Id. 
 35. BALANCING THE NEEDS, supra note 28, at tbl.2.14. 
 36. Id. at tbl.2.16. 
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leave. By far the largest category within both surveys was an inability 
to afford the leave.37 
Although these figures have been widely used and are helpful in 
understanding the needs of employees, they may overstate the 
effectiveness of the FMLA. The surveys identify all those who have 
taken, or have needed, leave that falls under the scope of the FMLA 
regardless of whether the employee actually took leave under the 
FMLA.38 For example, both studies showed large percentages of 
employees who received pay during their leave periods, indicating 
that such leave was not taken pursuant to the FMLA.39 
Litigation involving the FMLA confirms the importance of the 
sick-leave provisions and the relative unimportance of the parental 
leave provisions. My review of eighty-four cases heard on appeal 
during the years 2000–01 indicated that sixty-one of the claims 
(72.6%) involved individuals who were seeking, or who took, leave 
for their own illness.40 Just over fifteen percent of the cases involved 
leave that was related to the care of another, while only ten of the 
cases (11.9%) concerned care of a new child in the home.41 Although 
these appeals may not be representative of the universe of leave, the 
 37. Id. at tbl.2.17. 77.6% of those who were unable to take leave in the 2000 survey, and 
65.9% in the 1996 survey, listed financial constraint as a reason for not taking leave. Id. Large 
numbers of employees also listed work-related reasons, with 52.6% indicating that work was 
too important, and 42.6% expressing a fear that the taking of leave would adversely affect their 
career advancement. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. In the 2000 survey, just over sixty-five percent of leave-takers received some pay 
during their longest leave, and 72.2% of leave-takers received full pay during their entire leave. 
Id. at tbls.4.4, 4.6. Sick leave was the most common form of paid leave, with vacation leave 
providing the second largest form of paid leave. Id. at tbl.4.5. Over seventy percent of male 
leave-takers received pay during their longest leave, while 62.5% of female leave-takers did. Id. 
at tbl.A2–4.1. 87.7% of salaried workers received pay during their longest leave, compared to 
fifty-four percent of hourly workers. Id. Of those leave-takers receiving less than full pay during 
their leave, 50.9% would have taken longer leave if additional pay had been available. Id. at 
tbl.4.9. 
 40. The review was conducted on Lexis on December 8, 2003 using the search “date (is 
2001) and family /2 medical /1 leave”, which was then repeated for the year 2000. A significant 
number of cases that turned up in the search (sixty-nine) did not involve FMLA claims but 
instead made reference to the statute, and in twenty cases it was not possible to identify the 
basis for the leave. With respect to this last category, there is no particular reason to expect that 
the underlying bases would differ from those that were identifiable—in other words, there is no 
reason to think that this category of claim includes a disproportionately large number of cases 
involving leave relating to the birth or adoption of a child. 
 41. Id. 
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fact that the litigation parallels the documented leave-taking of 
employees suggests that the statute has, in fact, principally become an 
extension of sick leave rather than a parental leave statute.  
Upon reflection, this development should not have been so 
unexpected. Serious illness frequently occurs without notice, and 
many employees may not have taken the steps necessary to store sick 
leave in anticipation of a serious illness. Furthermore, large and small 
employers are less likely to offer paid sick leave to blue-collar and 
service employees (for large and small employers respectively, fifty 
and forty percent) than to professional employees (eighty-seven and 
eighty-eight percent).42 As a result, many employees, particularly 
those likely to find themselves toward the bottom of the income 
ladder, are without significant sick leave policies and have 
undoubtedly benefited from the pertinent FMLA provisions. 
In contrast, expectant parents can usually plan birth- or adoption-
related leave in advance, and many employees will rely on unused 
vacation, sick, or disability leave before resorting to any form of 
unpaid leave. 
III. WHY THE FMLA? 
There remains the question of why the FMLA was enacted, and 
why it was so controversial—generating two presidential vetoes 
despite its predictably limited effects. President Clinton made an 
important symbolic gesture when he signed the FMLA as his first 
legislative act, but nothing about the statute has extended much 
beyond the symbolic. Most studies focusing on the legislative process 
try to explain legislation through one of two theories: public choice 
or public interest. The public choice theory, which has been 
particularly influential in law over the last two decades (although its 
influence now seems in decline), concentrates on the influence of 
small but well-organized interest groups and treats legislators as 
 42. See U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., BUREAU OF LAB. STATISTICS, NATIONAL COMPENSATION 
SURVEY: EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1999 
SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES, at tbls.1, 3 (2000), available at http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/ 
ebt0001.pdf. The government classifies medium and large employers (which I refer to as large) 
as those with 100 or more employees, while small employers include those having fewer than 
100 employees. Id. at tbl.1 n.1, tbl.3 n.1. Id. 
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primarily interested in re-election.43 The public interest model, on the 
other hand, views legislation as designed to promote the public 
interest, and likewise sees legislators as principally motivated by their 
desire to influence or shape that public interest.44 
While both theories offer important insights, they fail to explain 
much of what we know about the legislative process. Daniel Shaviro 
has aptly described the theories as “the stick figures of noble public 
interest and venal public choice.”45 He has instead called for a 
messier conglomeration of the two theories, defining legislation as 
the product of a combination of competing interests, including 
reelection, the public interest, maintenance of power and status, and a 
possible future outside of politics.46 This picture of the legislative 
process is certainly more accurate than is either of the two theories 
alone, but it is also more difficult to offer as a particular or coherent 
story, or even to define as a distinct theory. But, in the case of the 
FMLA, this multiple-motive approach works well to explain why the 
legislation became such a critical issue in Congress—certainly there 
was a public interest component to the legislation, one that was likely 
seen as benefiting working families, a traditionally important 
Democratic constituency. This legislation, however, did not come 
without significant costs, given the business community’s staunch 
opposition. In the context of public choice theory, this should have 
been an easy case for defeat of the legislation, but instead Congress 
considered and passed the legislation on three separate occasions. It 
 43. The seminal work in the area is MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE 
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965). Within law, the standard 
reference work has become DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC 
CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991). 
 44. See Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest:A Study of the 
Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6 n.16 
(1990) (citing literature); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public Regarding Legislation Through 
Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986) (discussing 
and contrasting different approaches).  
 45. Daniel N. Shaviro, Exchange on Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 834, 839 (1990). 
 46. See Shaviro, supra note 44, at 111–23. Shaviro develops his theory in the context of 
the 1986 tax bill, but much of his analysis is applicable to other areas, as well. I should also 
note that much of my analysis in this essay is influenced by my experience living in 
Washington for most of the last fifteen years, as well as my limited involvement on the passage 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Congress was considering the 1991 Act, which was also vetoed 
on one occasion, during the same time as the FMLA was being formulated. 
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may be that the watered-down version of the FMLA that ultimately 
passed represented a concession to the business community. Still, the 
business community fought every version of the Act, helping to 
produce two presidential vetoes, suggesting that whatever 
concessions Congress had made failed to mollify the business 
community.47 Certainly if one theory must be chosen, the public 
interest theory better explains the FMLA. In this instance, a diffuse 
broad coalition of groups representing women and working families 
was able to override the interests of a well-established, well-
organized, and well-funded interest group. 
At the same time, the public interest theory would not fully 
explain the passage of the FMLA, given its many flaws. Almost 
certainly, the Act was seen as appealing to important constituencies, 
and in this instance, constituencies that often were not in alignment, 
given that both women’s groups and many conservative-oriented 
family organizations joined in their support of the Act.48 From this 
perspective, some conservative legislators may have supported the 
Act to gain the favor of conservative family groups, and in the 
process may have acquired some support among women as well. 
This is obviously a quick overview of complicated issues, but I 
now want to turn away from the motives of legislators to focus on the 
interest groups behind the legislation, to understand why they pushed 
so hard for legislation that they should have known would have such 
a limited impact. I have already identified two of the asserted 
rationales for the legislation: (1) something was better than nothing, 
and (2) the legislation would be an important first step toward more 
comprehensive legislation (I will refer to this as the “foot in the door” 
argument). We should accept neither of these arguments at face 
value, and further analysis will show that neither argument provided 
a compelling rationale for the legislation. Equally important, many 
potential downsides to such weak legislation were widely ignored. 
 47. It has been noted that the threat of a Presidential veto can actually soften opposition to 
legislation, and this may be what occurred with the FMLA. See JOHN R. WRIGHT, INTEREST 
GROUPS AND CONGRESS: LOBBYING, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND INFLUENCE 65 (1996). It may also 
be that a Presidential veto strengthened the position of the advocates who may have been as 
determined to defeat the President as they were to pass the legislation. 
 48. See ELVING, supra note 12, at 108–22 (discussing the mixed coalition that included 
Republican groups). 
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I also want to explore a third interest that may help explain why 
the legislation became so important, which is the aim of interest 
groups to ensure that legislation passes for which it can claim credit. 
Indeed, an interest group often has goals that differ from those of its 
constituents, and that divergence may best explain the passage of the 
FMLA. 
A. “Something is Better than Nothing” 
Part of the drive to pass the FMLA was the sense that some 
legislation, as a minimum standard, was essential. It was always less 
clear, however, precisely why this was seen as essential. To the extent 
that minimum standards legislation would be costless, then it may be 
difficult to object to the legislation, at least from the perspective of 
employees. But as I will demonstrate, legislation is never costless, 
and any analysis must balance the costs against the gains to assess the 
statute’s importance. 
One reason that proponents may have seen minimum standards 
legislation as necessary was for its symbolic effect, presumably 
sending a signal that the federal government considered work and 
family issues to be of critical importance. Another reason might be 
that minimum standards legislation would prompt employers to 
implement favorable policies, thus making the statute the “floor” of 
benefits—employers might then compete for employees by creating 
more generous policies. In the case of the FMLA, neither reason 
seemed to offer a persuasive justification, and neither reason was 
without its cost. 
Symbols are certainly important to legislative activities, and there 
is a rich literature involving the importance of symbolic legislation.49 
 49. See, e.g., Jack Citrin et al., The “Official English” Movement and the Symbolic 
Politics of Language in the United States, 43 W. POL. Q. 535 (1990); Hillard Pouncy, Terms of 
Agreement: Evaluating the Theory of Symbolic Politics’ Impact on the Pluralist Research 
Program, 32 AM. J. POL. SCI. 781 (1988); MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF 
POLITICS (1964) (describing the importance of symbols in politics). Within legal scholarship, 
the term “symbolic legislation” is typically used pejoratively. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Haste 
Makes Waste: Congress and the Common Law in Cyberspace, 55 VAND. L. REV. 309, 314–15 
(2002) (explaining that Congress may pass “easy statutes” when public opposition is negligible 
and thus neglect long-term problems); Steve R. Johnson, The Dangers of Symbolic Legislation: 
Perceptions and Realities of the New Burden-of-Proof-Rules, 84 IOWA L. REV. 413, 413, 427–
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Nevertheless, symbolic legislation typically offers more to the 
legislators than it does to the intended beneficiaries, and that seems 
true of the FMLA. According to the legislative advocates, the statute 
represented an important symbol of government support for working 
families, but as I have already discussed, that support was far less 
significant than it appeared, and far less than it should have been. In 
this way, the symbolic support could be described as deceptive—a 
way of creating the illusion that the government was committed to 
family issues without the need for a sincere, and more expensive, 
commitment. From an advocate’s perspective, symbolism should be a 
secondary rather than a primary value, and, at a minimum, the 
message must be accurate rather than misleading. As a result, it 
seems difficult to identify an important symbolic value to leave 
legislation that would likely prove of very limited utility to the 
majority of employees who could not afford to take unpaid family 
leave. 
Rather than as a symbolic message, the symbolic importance of 
the legislation may have come in a potential spillover effect. 
Employers with existing leave policies may have felt a need to 
ratchet up those policies as a way of staying ahead of the market once 
minimum standards legislation was in place. From this perspective, 
one might see the legislation as akin to a minimum wage law, which 
typically pushes up even those wages that lie above the minimum 
wage. Ultimately, whether this strategy would prove successful is an 
empirical question, but there is no available evidence to indicate that 
the statute actually had this effect, nor is there any particular reason 
to expect such an effect. Unlike wages, which are the primary means 
employers use to compete for employees, minimum standards 
legislation governing benefits is less likely to generate competition 
among employers. We can see this in other minimum standards 
legislation, such as the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act. Few, if any, employers offer more than the statutorily 
46 (1999) (describing new tax legislation as a “pernicious exercise in symbolic legislation”); 
Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statues and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE 
L.J. 1 (1997); John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233 
(1990) (explaining, using environmental law as an example, that symbolic legislation distorts 
the regulatory process). 
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mandated time-and-a-half benefit for overtime, and in this respect, 
family leave legislation seems more like overtime than it does 
minimum wage legislation, in that it does not address the primary 
benefit most employers offer. This is not to say that a minimum 
standards law could not create competition among employers, but 
only that it will not necessarily do so.  
Minimum standards legislation can also have the opposite effect, 
and there is some reason to believe that the FMLA has hindered 
rather than assisted efforts to pass more meaningful legislation, 
particularly on the state level. In the ten years prior to passage of the 
FMLA, a dozen states enacted family leave legislation, and another 
twenty had placed leave legislation on their agenda.50 Since the 
passage of the FMLA, only one state (California) has passed any 
meaningful leave legislation.51 To be sure, much of the state 
legislation under pre-FMLA consideration likely would have 
replicated what was ultimately enacted, but there was also the 
possibility that state legislatures would have enacted more favorable 
legislation in response to their local constituencies. This has been true 
recently with the progressive childcare legislation that was enacted 
by several states, in part because there is no comprehensive federal 
program for public support of childcare.52 At the same time, the 
failure of all states to amend their unemployment compensation 
systems to include provisions for family leave, as advocated by the 
Clinton administration, may suggest that more progressive state 
legislation was not likely forthcoming.53 While it is ultimately 
 50. See Jane Waldfogel, Family Leave Coverage in the 1990s, 122 MONTHLY LAB. REV., 
Oct. 1999, at 13. Of the thirty-four states that had enacted legislation, eleven only applied to 
public employees, and only twelve offered job-protected leave. Id. 
 51. See Act of Oct. 10, 2003, 2003 Cal. Legis. Serv. 797 (West) (codified in scattered 
sections of Labor Code, Unemployment Insurance Code). The California law provides for up to 
six weeks of paid leave through the state disability insurance program. Id. For a recent 
description of the legislation, see Natalie Koss, The California Family Temporary Disability 
Insurance Program, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1079 (2003).  
 52. Minnesota, for example, passed a state-funded, at-home infant childcare program that 
allows working parents who meet income eligibility requirements to receive subsidies for 
children under one year old. See MINN. STAT. § 119B.061 (2002). The statute has subsequently 
been repealed. For a comprehensive discussion of various state initiatives, see NATIONAL 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, MAKING CHILD CARE BETTER: STATE INITIATIVES 
(1999). 
 53. See Karen Syma Czapanskiy, Parents, Children, and Work-First Welfare Reform: 
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difficult to know whether the federal legislation actually impeded the 
development of more progressive state legislation, it is clear that it 
did not spawn any such legislation.  
In addition to stalling activity at the state level, it is also possible 
that the FMLA limited progress by individual employers. Before the 
FMLA’s passage, approximately forty percent of employees had 
access to family leave, either by state mandate or more commonly by 
individual company policies, and the FMLA failed to increase 
coverage other than by modest percentages.54 One of the great ironies 
of the FMLA is that it largely replicated leave that was already in the 
marketplace, given that large employers were far more likely to offer 
leave policies than smaller employers and only large employers are 
covered by the FMLA.55 Once minimum standards legislation is 
passed it can quite easily become the ceiling, rather than the floor, of 
benefits. Outside of a few employers who may see these benefits as 
offering important recruitment tools, most employers will offer what 
appears to be a standard and reasonable package, and when a federal 
mandate exists, the standard and reasonable package is likely to 
mimic the federal standard. Again, this appears to have been the 
actual effect of the FMLA legislation, as there are no data to suggest 
that employers are offering more than what the FMLA requires, or 
more than they were offering before.56 
Where is the C in TANF?, 61 MD. L. REV. 308, 316 n.30 (2002) (noting that no state had sought 
to include family leave within unemployment compensation pursuant to federal regulation that 
granted the option to states).  
 54. See Waldfogel, supra note 50, at 14 tbl.1. Based on data from the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth, the percentage of women reporting maternity leave coverage 
increased from seventy-six percent in 1990 to seventy-eight percent in 1996. Id. at 16 tbl.4. 
Reports of paternity leave coverage increased from forty-three to fifty-six percent during the 
same time period. Id. 
 55. See Selmi, supra note 28, at 762 (noting that “nearly 90% of full-time employees at 
large firms had access to disability plans that included coverage for pregnancy”). 
 56. Governmental surveys demonstrate no increase in paid maternity leave since the 
passage of the FMLA. From 1991 to 1997, the percentage of large employers (100 or more 
employees) that offer paid maternity leave has remained stable at two percent. Waldfogel, supra 
note 50, at 14 tbl.1. During that same period, paid paternity leave has increased from 1 to 2% of 
employers. Id. The only apparent positive effect is that some small employers that are not 
covered by the FMLA have changed their policies to incorporate FMLA leave, although the 
changes tend to apply only to women. See id. at 18.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 65 Selmi book pages.doc  4/23/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
84 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 15:65 
 
 
 
B. “The Foot in the Door” 
As discussed earlier, the primary rationale offered by legislative 
advocates was that the FMLA would lead to more progressive 
legislation in the future, and that it might do this by forging family 
leave benefits onto the national scene as an expected and important 
benefit.57 This might be one of the more important effects of the 
legislation, an effect that could initially be labeled as symbolic in 
nature but with tangible expected changes in the future.58 Mandating 
family leave would ultimately change employee expectations and 
employer perceptions about the workplace, informing both groups 
that employees have outside commitments that require 
accommodation in the workplace. This perceptional change, in turn, 
might ultimately lead to stronger legislation, including paid leave. 
While there does seem to have been a change in perception—
family leave has recently received substantially more attention than it 
had in the past—the hope for incremental legislation had little basis 
in experience. The history of civil rights law indicates that most 
legislative amendments have been in response to adverse judicial 
decisions or unexpected developments in the law or policy.59 The 
Civil Rights Act of 1991,60 for example, originated as a response to 
seven adverse court decisions rendered in the 1980s.61 Even though 
some provisions of that law went beyond reversing court decisions, 
there is little reason to believe that such provisions would have 
passed without the impetus provided by the Supreme Court’s 
decisions; indeed, Congress introduced no such legislation until after 
 57. See supra note 23 and text accompanying notes 22–23.  
 58. Within the social norms literature, symbolic legislation is thought to influence the 
development of social norms. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and 
Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 418–19 (1997).  
 59. For a classic article on legislation designed to overturn Supreme Court decisions, see 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 
YALE L.J. 331 (1991). Title VII was amended in 1972 to apply to state and local governments, 
but most of the subsequent amendments, as discussed in the text, have been in response to 
judicial decisions.  
 60. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000). 
 61. See Michael J. Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structure of Disparate Treatment 
Discrimination Litigation, 30 GA. L. REV. 563, 606 (1996) (“The intent and purpose of the 
1991 Civil Rights Act was to ‘liberalize’ antidiscrimination law as a congressional response to a 
series of Supreme Court decisions that had narrowed the law severely.”). 
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the Court’s most restrictive decisions were issued in 1989. Likewise, 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 196762 has been 
amended on a number of occasions to respond to restrictive judicial 
interpretations,63 and the same holds true for the Civil Rights 
Restoration Act of 1987, which was also passed in response to a 
Supreme Court statutory interpretation,64 and the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act.65 
Legislators have rarely amended other employment-related 
legislation, despite what is widely perceived as a need for substantial 
change. In substance, the Fair Labor Standards Act66 remains largely 
as it was when it was enacted in 1938, except for periodic minimum 
wage adjustments. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act67 
(ERISA) remains virtually unchanged since its passage in 1974, 
despite the surge in litigation regarding the provisions of the act 
relating to health benefit plans. This list could continue, but the point 
should be clear: there was no good reason for FMLA proponents to 
believe that establishing a baseline for family leave would provide a 
“foot-in-the-door” toward a more comprehensive and stronger policy. 
In fact, quite the opposite may be true. Passing weak legislation 
when an opportunity presents itself may forestall stronger legislation 
in the future; many legislators may be reluctant to revisit an issue 
once it is settled law. Again, that appears to describe the situation 
with the FMLA—no bill to amend the FMLA has emerged out of a 
Congressional Committee over the last ten years.68 Even discussions 
 62. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2000). 
 63. See James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretation of 
Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response? 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (1994) (noting that the 
“principal purpose and effect of the [1990 Amendments] was to override the Court’s decision”). 
 64. See 20 U.S.C. § 1687–88, 29 U.S.C. §§ 706, 794; 42 U.S.C. § 2000d–4a; William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 
79 CAL. L. REV. 613, 636 (2000) (noting that the statute was intended to overturn the Supreme 
Court decision in Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984)). 
 65. Pub. L. No. 95–555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000)); 
see also Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678 (1983) 
(noting that the 1978 amendments to Title VII was in response to Supreme Court Gilbert 
decision). 
 66. Ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19 (2000)). 
 67. 93 Pub. L. No. 93–406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. 
§§ 410–11 (2000) and in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). 
 68. See Steven K. Wisendale, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: the Family and 
Medical Leave Act as Retrenchment Policy, 20 REV. POL’Y RES. 135, 145–48 (2003) 
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regarding a very modest proposal to amend the statute to allow 
parents to attend parent-teacher conferences failed to produce any 
legislative activity.69 Again, I do not mean to suggest that the 
advocates did not believe the FMLA would lead to stronger 
legislation in the future, only that they had little reason based on past 
experience to believe that would be a likely result. Whatever belief 
the advocates actually had might be better classified as a “hope” 
rather than an expectation. 
C. The Interests of Interest Groups 
If the stated motives do not fully explain the legislation, then what 
does? Another, often unacknowledged, reason why such limited 
legislation would be acceptable to its advocates involves the 
importance of passing legislation to the advocates themselves. Most 
of the important players in the push to pass national family leave 
legislation were Washington public-interest groups, such as the 
National Women’s Law Center and the Women’s Legal Defense 
Fund.70 Other groups outside of Washington were also involved in 
the legislative process, but all of the groups shared a core interest in 
ensuring that legislation passed because of the direct benefits the 
groups receive because of their role in the process. 
All of the groups received widespread publicity for their roles in 
passing the FMLA, and many of the groups touted their 
accomplishments as a way of increasing their exposure to donors and 
other interested parties.71 This was particularly important for the 
(discussing efforts to amend FMLA).  
 69. On several occasions, President Clinton proposed amending the FMLA to allow 
parents twenty-four hours of leave to attend functions such as parent-teacher conferences. See 
Clinton Steps up Pressure for Family Leaves, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1997, at A27. The efforts 
never went beyond early discussions. 
 70. For a list of the groups that participated in the lobbying efforts over the FMLA, see 
WRIGHT, supra note 47, at 63 tbl.3.4. 
 71. Ten years later, the passage of the FMLA remains prominent among the achievements 
of these groups. The National Partnership for Women & Families, which is the successor group 
to the Women’s Legal Defense Fund, devotes a significant portion of its website to its 
achievements under the FMLA. NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, NATIONAL 
PARTNERSHIP CELEBRATES 10TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FMLA!, at http://www.national 
partnership.org (last visited Apr. 19, 2004) (“The National Partnership for Women & Families 
conceived, drafted and championed the FMLA during the almost-decade-long fight to make it 
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women’s groups involved with the FMLA, because many of them 
had sharply reduced, if not eliminated, their litigation efforts by the 
time the Act was passed. As a result, accomplishments with respect 
to legislative efforts become important tangible benefits that interest 
groups could display to their donors, both as a way of justifying past 
expense and as a way of securing future financial support. 
In this respect, the interest groups themselves have interests that 
are often distinct from the groups that they are purporting to 
represent, and that instead often mirror the interests of legislators. 
Most legislative models treat interest groups as a surrogate for 
defined interests, but many public interest groups differ from the 
traditional model in that they do not have any clients or even 
constituents, and instead, they largely establish the interests and 
preferences of those they purport to represent.72 This is true even of 
those groups with memberships, as it is rare that the membership 
would establish interests rather than follow the interests articulated 
by the leadership. Yet, because much of their funding comes from 
foundations,73 interest groups’ loyalties in the legislative process are 
often divided between creation of an activity that will lead to further 
or secured funding, and ensuring that the legislation will provide 
direct benefits to constituents. Often these goals are not in conflict, 
but when they do conflict, as may have been true with the FMLA, the 
funding concerns may ultimately prevail due to the essential need for 
funding to ensure institutional survival. 
It is worth emphasizing that the model of representation by public 
interest groups differs significantly from other traditional lobbying 
groups, such as trade groups, which directly reflect the interests of a 
majority of their members. Public interest groups, on the other hand, 
law.”). 
 72. See JEFFREY M. BERRY, LOBBYING FOR THE PEOPLE (1977). 
 73. For example, during fiscal year 2002–03, the National Women’s Law Center received 
seventy-two percent of its funding from foundation grants. See E-Mail from Francis E. Thomas, 
Vice President of Administration, National Women’s Law Center, to Stacy Garrick, author’s 
research assistant (Oct. 24, 2003) (on file with author). In contrast, the National Partnership for 
Women and Families receives substantially fewer of its funds, approximately thirty percent, 
from foundations; rather, it obtains the majority of its funding from contributions. See NAT’L 
P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, 1999–2000 ANNUAL REPORT 16 (2001). It is important to 
note that the source of the contributions are not identified, and it is quite likely that some, or 
perhaps most, come from corporate as opposed to individual sponsors. 
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more commonly follow the preferences of their leaders, largely under 
the assumption that those preferences will be in the best interests of 
the group.74 However, as the leaders establish the preferences, the 
membership is rarely consulted.75 The history of the Family and 
Medical Leave legislation confirms this perspective. Although the 
legislation’s proponents occasionally urged its members to write 
letters to Congressional representatives in support of the legislation, 
they never appeared to solicit the views of the members regarding 
their needs and interests. This was true even for the union lobbyists, 
who were initially reluctant to go forward with unpaid leave 
legislation, but who ultimately offered their support because paid 
leave was seen as an unrealistic option.76 There was no indication, 
however, that the unions ever surveyed their members regarding their 
need for unpaid leave, nor did the women’s groups ever directly 
consult members or women about the legislation other than with 
respect to the letter-writing campaigns. 
In addition to external concerns regarding funding, interest groups 
are also interested in preserving their influence and status within 
Washington. Failure to pass or support legislation may directly affect 
the lobbyists’ influence with legislators in subsequent efforts. If 
legislative efforts deteriorate late in the process, legislators may feel 
that their time was wasted or that the lobbyists failed to assess 
accurately the prospects for successful passage of the legislation, with 
the likely effect that the lobbyists’ credibility would be diminished in 
the future. This is another way in which pressure to pass legislation 
develops independent of the merits of the legislation—once 
legislators become invested in the process it becomes increasingly 
difficult for the advocates to withdraw their support without risking 
 74. See Robert H. Salisbury, Interest Representation: The Dominance of Institutions, 78 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 64, 66 (1984) (“Quite often group leaders espouse policy positions with 
only tenuous support from their members, although severe discrepancies between leader actions 
and member wishes are probably rare and generally short-lived.”). 
 75. See SCOTT H. AINSWORTH, ANALYZING INTEREST GROUPS: GROUP INFLUENCE ON 
PEOPLE AND POLICIES 122–24 (2002) (noting how interests of leaders can differ from 
preferences of members and how many interest groups are “groups on paper only”); Shaviro, 
supra note 44, at 87–88 (discussing various interests of legislative advocates and their “desire 
for influence and concern about policy, as well as sheer enjoyment of the political game”).  
 76. See ELVING, supra note 12, at 39–40. 
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future recriminations.77 Similarly, a group’s status within Washington 
often derives from its influence among legislators, and this symbiotic 
relationship may often result in accepting compromises that may not 
be in the best interests of the ultimate constituents. Compromises 
along these lines can be easy to justify because a group’s enhanced 
status may lead to important influence on future legislation.  
Not only do concerns about funding, influence, and status often 
determine legislative choices, but other factors compel the parties 
toward legislation even when the substance of the legislation remains 
far from the preferred goal. After working toward legislation for 
several years, it becomes very difficult psychologically to walk away 
from the process without something tangible in hand. The investment 
in the process is simply too substantial to leave behind, and as a 
result, that investment can influence how the lobbyists or advocates 
view potential legislation, causing them to view the legislation more 
optimistically while overlooking its flaws.78 In many ways, lobbying 
for legislation resembles the investment process that frequently drives 
settlements in litigation; but unlike litigation, where a failed 
settlement leads to a trial, failed legislative efforts often lead to 
nothing other than the possibility of further efforts in subsequent 
years. This provides an even stronger incentive for compromise. 
This analysis may suggest that interest groups have more power in 
the legislative process than they actually do, and it is easy to 
overstate the influence of interest groups, most of which rarely 
possess the power to ensure passage of legislation. At the same time, 
groups often do have the power to halt legislation, and this is 
particularly true for interest groups that comprise a natural 
constituency for the legislation. This was plainly the case for the 
FMLA. It is inconceivable that the congressional sponsors would 
have gone ahead with the legislation absent the support of women’s 
groups. If those groups had determined that they would only support 
strong leave legislation, which would have presumably included paid 
 77. In Washington, these future recriminations may extend beyond work for the 
immediate group, as it is common that lobbyists move to different organizations and often rely 
on Congress and its world of contacts to make those moves. 
 78. This is certainly not a psychological phenomenon limited to lobbyists or litigators. For 
a recent book on the many ways we adaptive to our conditions, see TIMOTHY D. WILSON, 
STRANGERS TO OURSELVES: DISCOVERING THE ADAPTIVE UNCONSCIOUS (2002). 
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leave, the FMLA as enacted would never have come to pass. The 
business opposition was too substantial and, without the support of 
women’s groups, the legislators would have had no electoral payoff 
for passing a leave bill while facing significant costs from the 
business community. This is, of course, quite different from 
suggesting that the interest groups had the power to enact a paid leave 
law—they clearly did not. As such, the choice was either a weak law, 
or else no law at all; the advocacy groups chose to support the weak 
law. 
I should add one final note, which is that I do not mean to criticize 
or blame the advocates for the limitations of the FMLA. Rather, what 
I mean to suggest is that the process surrounding the FMLA is part of 
the legislative process—it is part of what is to be expected, part of the 
ways in which legislation is enacted, and the distinct motivations of 
interests groups can often offer important insights into the limitations 
that emerge from legislation. 
IV. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
The FMLA presents an interesting case study in what can be 
labeled unintended but predictable consequences of legislation. The 
intent of the legislation was noble: to provide a minimum standard 
for parents to care for a new child or a sick person under their care. 
At the same time, what was offered was simply too little to be 
anything more than symbolic. Instead, the law may have limited the 
possibilities of stronger legislation in the future while creating a 
cottage industry of litigation regarding when one’s own illness rises 
to the level of a “serious illness” covered by the statute. I do not 
mean to suggest that the law has been without any beneficial effects, 
or that it should be repealed. As noted earlier, many low-income 
workers have gained an important safety net that allows for the 
preservation of their jobs in the case of serious illness or a new child. 
That safety net likely proves critical for many families every day. 
Family leave issues have also gained in importance over the last 
decade, and it is quite likely that the FMLA has increased public 
awareness, though that awareness has not been matched by 
significant legislative aid. 
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In the end, whether the FMLA was worth the costs is a difficult 
question to answer. Nevertheless, it seems clear that neither the 
advocates nor the legislative sponsors took that question seriously. As 
a result we are left with leave legislation that remains among the 
weakest of any nation in the world, without any serious prospects for 
change. 
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